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Oral Argument Priority 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action. 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). This court has pour-over jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering 
specific performance of the parties' contract, where the contract 
specified all essential terms? This issue is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976, 
979 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Is an option which provides that the property may be 
purchased for fair market value sufficiently definite to be 
*David Baldwin passed away subsequent to the filing of his 
brief. 
enforceable? The propriety of specific performance is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, id. Inherent legal issues are reviewed for 
correctness. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering a 
conveyance of water consistent with the parties course of dealing 
and usage, even though it may technically violate water company 
rules? Review is for abuse of discretion. Id. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendants7 statement of issues presented posits 13 issues 
under three broad categories. Defendants' argument contains 10 
main points, which do not readily correlate to the claimed issues. 
Some of the claimed issues are not supported by argument. This 
section attempts to make a correlation between the issues and the 
argument, and to briefly respond to matters which require only a 
brief response. Defendants' specific issues and points of argument 
are listed below, with a reference to the point in this brief which 
responds to each issue or argument. 
Defendants' Issue A.l. [The lower Court erred by holding that 
the contract was clear and unambiguous.]: This issue is addressed 
in Point I. 
Defendants' Issue A.2. [The lower Court erred in finding that 
there existed an enforceable contract between plaintiff and 
defendants.]: This issue is addressed in Point I. 
Defendants' Issue A.3. [The lower Court erred by reforming a 
clear and unambiguous contract.]: Although plaintiff sought 
2 
reformation in her complaint (R. 461-64), neither the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 702-15) nor the First Amended 
Partial Judgment and Decree (R. 756-60) contains any language 
purporting to reform the contracts. Because the trial court did 
not reform the contract, there is no issue to which plaintiff need 
respond. 
Defendants7 Issue A.4. [The lower court erred by ordering 
specific performance for an ambiguous contract.]: This issue is 
addressed in Point I. 
Defendants7 Issue A.5. [The lower Court erred in ordering a 
sale which was in violation of existing water rights.]: This issue 
is addressed in Point III. 
Defendants7 Issue A.6. [The lower court erred in disposing of 
Mrs. Baldwin7s rights in the property when Mrs. Baldwin was not a 
party to the contract upon which the lower Court based its 
decision.]: This issue is addressed in Point I.E. 
Defendants7 Issue B.l. [The lower Court erred by denying 
defendants7 motion for summary judgment.]: Defendants7 argument 
does not specifically address this claimed issue, but it is 
implicit in sections A-G of the defendants7 Argument. The issue is 
addressed in Point I. 
Defendants7 Issue B.2. [The lower Court erred by reversing the 
summary judgment previously granted to defendants.]: The trial 
court did not "reverse" its prior grant of summary judgment. Judge 
David L. Mower orally granted defendants7 motion for summary 
3 
judgment following a hearing held December 20, 1994. (R. 355-56.) 
Following that hearing, and before any formal order was entered, 
plaintiff moved for the disqualification of Judge Mower. (R. 369-
71.) The motion was referred to Judge Louis Tervort for hearing 
(see R. 412-23) and was granted following a hearing held February 
16, 1995. (R. 411.) The order implementing the disqualification 
expressly vacated the prior oral grant of summary judgment. (R. 
426-29.) Judge Tibbs reconsidered defendants' summary judgment 
motion, and denied it following a hearing held April 12, 1995. (R. 
441, 445-59.) 
Defendants do not claim that the disqualification was 
improper. It followed from the grant of disqualification that 
Judge Mower's ruling would be vacated. Even if there had been no 
disqualification, the trial court would still have been free to 
reexamine and change the ruling on the summary judgment. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b); Ron Shepherd Insurance. Inc. v. Shields. 882 P.2d 
650, 654 (Utah 1994) ("it is settled law that a trial court is free 
to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final 
order or judgment.") There was, therefore, no error in "reversing" 
the summary judgment previously granted. 
Defendants' Issue B.3. [The lower Court erred by entering 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff when plaintiff had not moved 
for summary judgment.]: The trial court did not grant summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. (R. 445-59) . Even if the court had 
done so, it would not have been procedurally improper. Utah R. 
4 
Civ. P. 54(c) specifically provides that M[E]very final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings.'1 The application of this rule to allow 
summary judgment against a moving party where no cross-motion was 
filed is well established in cases under the analogous federal 
rules. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); 
Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Mountain States Tel., 734 F.2d 1402 (10th 
Cir. 1986). 
Issue C.l. [The lower Court erred by granting both a legal and 
equitable remedy to plaintiff for the same alleged wrong.]: This 
issue is addressed in Point IV. 
Issue C.2. [The lower Court erred in refusing the jury 
instructions and corrections to jury instructions requested by 
defendants.]: To challenge a failure to give a jury instruction or 
the giving of an incorrect instruction, a party must show the 
proposed instruction is a correct statement of the law, that the 
party was entitled to the instruction under the facts and theories 
presented, that the subject was not adequately covered by other 
instructions, and that the failure to give the instruction was 
prejudicial. Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996); Snyderville Transportation Co. v. Christiansen, 609 
P.2d 939, 942 (Utah 1980) . The party must also show that the party 
made a specific objection at trial: 
The objection must be sufficiently specific to 
give the trial court notice of the claimed 
5 
error in the instruction. An objection that 
an instruction is not supported by, and is 
contrary to the law lacks that degree of 
specificity so as to direct the court's atten-
tion to a particular matter. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake Citv v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 
(Utah 1974). 
Defendants have made no attempt to comply with these require-
ments. The only argument addressed to this issue is the last 
paragraph of Section J, on page 47 of defendants7 brief. That 
paragraph make a broad accusation of error,2 but gives absolutely 
no detail or substance. Defendants' objections below were 
similarly lacking in any meaningful detail. (Tr. 675 (R. 1049); 
tr. 751 (R. 1085).) This Court should refuse to consider the 
issue. 
Issue C.3. [The lower Court erred in refusing to give the jury 
the special verdict interrogatories requested by defendants.]: As 
with the prior claimed issue, defendants present no arguments in 
support of this claim. Defendants do not even give a record 
citation to their proposed special verdict interrogatories nor 
attach a copy to their brief, nor has plaintiff been able to 
2The claim that the trial court refused every jury instruction 
requested by defendants is false. The trial court's Instructions 
nos. 10 (R. 686), 18 (R. 695), and 20 (R. 697) are identical to 
instructions requested by defendants (R. 618, 621, 620). Many of 
defendants' other requested instructions were given in substance. 
For example, defendants' first two requested instructions (R. 595-
96) were essentially identical, and were covered in substance in 
the trial court's Instruction No. 1. (R. 680.) 
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discover a copy in the record. This Court should refuse to 
consider the issue. 
Issue C.4. [The lower Court erred by refusing to accept offers 
of proof by defendants.]: The trial court did refuse to accept 15 
proffers by defendants, after having listened to at least 13 
proffers and at least five side-bar conferences. Defendants do 
not, however, give a record citation to any of those incidents, 
defendants do not cite any legal authority to show why the refusals 
were error, nor do defendants show how they were prejudiced by the 
refusals. (The record supports the refusals.3) This Court should 
3Much of the evidence defendants apparently wanted to present 
would have consisted solely of defendants' interpretation or 
understanding of the contracts. Although there must be a "meeting 
of the minds" for a contract to exist, that concurrence of intent 
is found not in the parties having thought the same thing, but in 
their having said the same thing. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 
P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981) ("The basic rule of contract interpre-
tation is that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from 
the content of the instrument itself . . . . " ) ; Jaramillo v. 
Farmers Ins. Group. 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1993) ("unexpressed 
intentions do not affect the validity of a contract"); Allen v. 
Bissinaer & Co.. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923) (The law 
"judges of his intentions by his outward expressions and excludes 
all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his words 
or acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to 
agree to the matter in question, that agreement is established, and 
it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his 
mind upon the subject.") (citation omitted); Kitzke v. Turnidae. 
307 P. 2d 522, 527 (Or. 1957) ("The law of contracts is not 
concerned with the parties' undisclosed intents and ideas. It 
gives heed only to their communications and overt acts."); Hotel 
Riviera. Inc. v. Torres. 632 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Nev. 1981) ("The 
making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in 
one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signs, 
—not on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their have 
said the same thing.") (citation omitted, italics in original). 
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decline to consider the issue,4 Burns v. Summerhavs, 302 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 48, 49 (Ct. App. Oct. 31, 1996). 
Argument A. [The court cannot write the parties' contract for 
them.]: This is addressed in Point I. 
Argument B. [A contract which is indefinite as to a material 
term cannot be enforced.]: This is addressed in Point I. 
Argument C. [The agreement does not provide a means for fixing 
the purchase price without the further expression of the parties. ]: 
This is addressed in Point I.e. 
Argument D. [The court cannot reform an agreement not made.]: 
The court did not reform the agreement. See discussion for Issue 
A.3 above. 
Argument E. [The parties [sic] agreement did not address the 
matter of warranties, including particularly the warranty against 
environmental hazards.]: This is addressed in Point I.A. and Point 
II. 
Argument F. [Plaintiff has admitted that the parties did not 
reach agreement on the essential terms of purchase and that she 
wants the court to supply those terms.]: This challenges the 
reformation which did not occur. See discussion for Issue A. 3 
defendants' brief is laden with unwarranted aspersions at 
Judge Tibbs. Defendants do not, however, and could not, make any 
claim that Judge Tibbs was prejudiced or biased. Many examples 
could be given of trial rulings against the plaintiff. The trial 
was conducted in a fair and even-handed manner, and Judge Tibbs 
showed remarkable long-suffering restraint notwithstanding 
contemptuous remarks by defendants' counsel. E.g., Tr. 539-40 (R. 
1015). 
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above. The court did properly hold that the law infers certain 
provisions, as is explained in Points I, II, and III. 
Argument G. [The most basic and essential terms of the 
proposed purchase were never agreed upon.]: This is addressed in 
Point I. 
Argument H. [There is no agreement on the single nondivisible 
water membership and the court cannot supply the same.]: This is 
addressed in Point III. 
Argument I. [Impropriety of Summary Judgment.]: There was no 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. See Issue B.3 above. 
Argument J. [The trial below was procedurally defective.]: 
See Issues C.l, C.2, C.3, and C.4 above. 
Defendants have referred to many other evidentiary and other 
issues, particularly in defendants' Summary of Argument and in 
their statement of the Nature of the Case. These claims appear to 
be mentioned primary to make a personal criticism of the trial 
court. Defendants advance no arguments in support of these claims, 
and plaintiff has not addressed those claims in this brief. This 
Court should summarily reject any claims raised by defendants which 
are not supported by meaningful argument. Burns, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
Plaintiff is not aware of any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules whose interpretation is determinative of the 
issues raised on appeal. 
9 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action. 
Plaintiff's complaint sought specific performance of an option to 
purchase real property, and damages for the delay in receiving 
specific performance. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff filed her complaint August 2, 1993. (R. 1-6.) The 
initial complaint named only David Baldwin as the defendant. 
Gloria Baldwin was named as a defendant in an amended complaint 
filed November 12, 1993. (R. 19-31.) Defendants answered and 
counterclaimed for unlawful detainer.5 (R. 35-47.) 
Defendants moved for summary judgment against plaintiff's 
complaint on August 26, 1994. (R. 60-61.) Following briefing, the 
court set the motion for oral argument. (R. 352-53.) At the oral 
arguments, the court (Judge David K. Mower) disclosed potentially 
conflicting relationships he had with the defendants' attorney, but 
proceeded with arguments on the summary judgment motion. At the 
conclusion of the hearing Judge Mower orally granted the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment. (R. 355-56.) Soon after the 
hearing, plaintiff moved for the disqualification of Judge Mower. 
(R. 369-71.) Judge Mower disputed the sufficiency of the affidavit 
5
 The judgment on appeal does not formally dismiss the counter-
claim, but does include a certification under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) 
that the judgment is final. The issues in the counterclaim were 
resolved by stipulation of the parties, but apparently no formal 
order was entered. 
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of prejudice and referred the case for decision by another judge. 
(R. 412-23.) Judge Louis G. Tervort was assigned to decide the 
disqualification motion and, following a hearing, granted the 
motion. (R. 411.) The order of disqualification also provided that 
the prior summary judgment was vacated. (R. 426-29.) 
The case was assigned to Judge Don V. Tibbs, who scheduled new 
arguments on the summary judgment motion. Following arguments, 
Judge Tibbs denied the motion for summary judgment. (R. 441, 445-
59.) 
With leave of court, plaintiff filed a Second Amended 
Complaint and Jury Demand on May 5, 1995 (R. 460-74) , and 
defendants answered the amendment. (R. 488-90.) The case proceeded 
to trial before a jury from November 27-30, 1995. (R. 668-78.) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court made oral 
findings on the equitable issues and held that plaintiff was 
entitled to specific performance. (Tr. 661 (R. 1045).) The court 
submitted to the jury the issue of damages resulting from the delay 
in specific performance. (Tr. 666 (R. 1047).) The jury awarded 
damages of $8,000.00. (Tr. 746 (R. 1084).) The issue of attorney 
fees was reserved for a subsequent hearing. (Tr. 462 (R. 996).) 
A hearing on attorney fees was held January 22, 1996. (R. 746-
48.) The trial court awarded attorney fees of $25,000.00, 
approximately half the amount claimed. (Id.) The First Amended 
Partial Judgment and Decree was entered March 8, 1996, which 
incorporated all prior rulings of the court but retained 
11 
jurisdiction to enforce certain provisions of the decree of 
specific performance. (R. 756-60.) The decree included a provision 
stating that it should be deemed final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id) J 10. 
Defendants filed their notice of appeal on March 14, 1996. (R. 
761.) Defendants sought and received an extension of time to file 
a cross-appeal (R. 1103), and filed their notice of appeal on the 
attorney fee issues on July 15, 1996. (R. 1105.) 
C Statement of Facts. 
On June 6, 1984, Ada ("Billie") Jones and Marilyn ("Pondy") 
Hansen executed a contract (Exhibit 1) with David Baldwin and 
Gloria Baldwin to lease the Baldwins' Phillips 66 service station 
and the real property on which it stood. (Tr. 144-45 (R. 880).) 
The service station had not been used for approximately ten years. 
(Tr. 171-72 (R. 886-87).) Hansen and Jones expended about 
$9,500.00 for improvements and spent two to three weeks cleaning, 
remodeling, and painting the service station and opened it as the 
Burr Trail Cafe. (Tr. 360, 440 (R. 951, 971).) 
The Baldwins lived on property adjoining the cafe. (Tr. 163 
(R. 884).) The property on which Baldwins lived was titled in the 
name of Howard and Ada Church, the parents of Gloria Baldwin. (Tr. 
230 (R. 919).) The former service station property, now a cafe, 
was titled in Baldwins' names. (Tr. 144 (R. 880).) 
Marilyn Hansen moved out of town later in 1984 because she was 
getting divorced (Tr. 293 (R. 934)), and Ada Jones bought out her 
12 
interest. (Tr. 361 (R. 951).) Baldwins and Jones modified their 
1984 agreement at least twice by interlineation on the original 
agreement. (Tr. 185 (R. 890).) The modifications deleted Marilyn 
Hansen as a party to the lease and changed the rental amount. 
These changes to the contract were initialed by Ada Jones (and 
Marilyn Hansen while she was still involved) and David Baldwin. 
(Tr. 185-88 (R. 890-91).) Gloria Baldwin typically did not initial 
the changes, but they were usually made in her presence and she 
approved of the changes. (Tr. 149, 335-36, 363 (R. 881, 945, 952).) 
In 1992, David Baldwin required that a new agreement be made. 
(Tr. 150, 198-99 (R. 882, 911).) The parties met in the home of 
David and Gloria Baldwin and David Baldwin wrote, in longhand, a 
new agreement. (Tr. 152 (R. 882).) Although Gloria Baldwin did not 
sign the agreement, she was present during this process and voiced 
no objection to the new agreement. (Tr. 338 (R. 946).) 
The 1992 agreement granted Jones an option to purchase in the 
following language: 
3. At any time during this agreement the 
grantee may have the first right of refusal to 
purchase said property. 
a. The purchase price shall be fixed, 
at that time, at a fair market value, as 
established by the opinions of three (3) 
independent appraisers to be selected by 
mutual agreement of the parties hereto. 
b. The remaining terms of such purchase 
shall be established at that time by mutual 
agreement of the parties hereto. 
Exhibit 2. 
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Baldwins claimed at trial that this provision provided for a 
first right of refusal rather than an option. Jones presented 
evidence, however, that Mr. Baldwin had spoken of the provision as 
an option. (Tr. 249, 423-24, 436-37 (R. 923, 967, 970).) 
The original agreement included a provision that one-half of 
Jones's rent payments would be applied as a down payment if Jones 
exercised her option to purchase. (Exhibit 1, J 3.B.) The new 
agreement did not expressly include this equity accumulation 
provision, but Mr. Baldwin told Ms. Jones she would still get her 
equity under the new agreement. (Tr. 368 (R. 953).) On August 1, 
1993, Mr. Baldwin told Ms. Jones her equity was $15,036.00. 
(Exhibit 6, tr. 373-74 (R. 954-55).) The trial court found that 
the 1992 agreement was an extension or modification of the 1984 
agreement and that the terms of the prior agreement carried 
forward, and that Ms. Jones was therefore entitled to apply her 
equity credit against the purchase price of the property. (R. 706 
5 7.) 
Jones wanted to exercise her option to purchase the property, 
and asked David Baldwin on several occasions for a price. She also 
asked him to have the property appraised pursuant to the agreement. 
(Tr. 371, 418 (R. 954, 966).) He responded, in the later part of 
December, 1992, that "it didn't matter what the appraisal, he'd 
sell it for what he wanted." (Tr. 418 (R. 966).) 
Jones ultimately sought the assistance of an attorney, and 
with his help, submitted a written tender, pursuant to Utah Code 
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Ann. S 78-27-1, offering to pay "the purchase price of the premises 
as may be established by three independent appraisers." (Exhibit 3, 
tr. 372 (R. 954).) In the document of tender, Jones stated her 
willingness to cooperate in the selection of appraisers, and 
alternatively stated her willingness to pay $40,000.00 as an 
alternative to the appraised value. Jones present evidence that 
the fair market value of the property at the time Jones tendered 
performance was less than $39,000.00. (Tr. 285 (R. 932).) Ms. 
Jones had the ability at the time of the tender to pay the 
$40,000.00. (Tr. 415, 438 (R. 965, 971).) 
Baldwin did not respond to the tender for a month, and then 
his response was to simply refuse to sell and to purport to 
withdraw any offer to sell. (Exhibit 5, tr. 372 (R. 954).) 
Plaintiff then commenced this lawsuit seeking specific performance 
of the contract. 
The cafe property and Baldwins' adjoining residence were 
serviced by a single commercial water connection from Boulder 
Farmstead Water Company. The water meter was on the cafe property. 
(Tr. 426 (R. 968).) The cafe property was the only real property 
in Baldwins' name until two weeks prior to trial, at which time the 
home property was also transferred into Baldwins' name. The 
president of the Boulder Farmstead Water Company testified that the 
company was not selling additional water shares and did not 
currently permit the division of water shares, but that the company 
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recognized that it would be required to make provision for such a 
division. (Tr. 507-09 (R. 1007).) 
Two underground storage tanks remaining from the service 
station operations remained on the property. (Tr. 588 (R. 1027).) 
The Baldwins had not complied with the applicable registration 
requirements of the Utah State Department of Environmental Quality. 
(Exhibits 10, 12; tr 598-99 (R. 1030).) 
The Burr Trail Cafe enjoyed a reputation for quality. 
Customers were pleased with the size of the servings and the 
quality of the food. (Tr. 247, 300-01 (R. 923, 936).) Jones was 
evicted from the cafe during the pendency of the lawsuit, following 
the 1994 summer tourist season. (Tr. 379 (R. 956).) Baldwins 
thereafter undertook to operate the cafe, but did not enjoy the 
same reputation. Customers complained that the portions were 
smaller, the service poor, and the food not as tasty. (Tr. 249, 
301-02 (R. 923, 936-37).) The drop in quality provided an opening 
for other restaurants to move into town and capture some of the 
business formerly enjoyed by the Burr Trail Cafe. (Tr. 249, 624-25 
(R. 923, 1036).) For example, Mark Austin, the co-owner of the 20-
room Boulder Mountain Lodge (tr. 237, 257 (R. 920, 925)), had 
referred perhaps several hundred customers to Jones's restaurant. 
(Tr. 256 (R. 925).) After Baldwins took over the restaurant, 
Austin determined he needed to build his own restaurant because the 
quality of the Baldwin restaurant was unacceptable. (Tr. 249 (R. 
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923).) Austin's restaurant was scheduled to be completed by 
Christmas 1995. (Tr. 256 (R. 925).) 
Jones's damages from being evicted from the cafe included 
$20,258.60 in lost profits from the cafe, and $4,200.00 in lost 
rental income she could have obtained from her house in Salt Lake 
City, to which she had to move after being evicted from the cafe. 
(Ex. 19, tr. 384-85 (R. 957).) She testified her net damage, 
including her lost equity, was $32,491.65. (Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties entered into a valid lease which granted plaintiff 
an option to purchase. Although labeled as a right of first 
refusal, the contract language was consistent only with an option. 
Other evidence confirmed that the parties intended an option, and 
rendered the contract sufficiently definite for specific perfor-
mance. The contract and the evidence thus fully supported the 
trial court's decree ordering specific performance of the option. 
The option implicitly required defendants to convey marketable 
title. The decree's requirement that defendants comply with 
environmental laws by removing gasoline storage tanks was necessary 
to make the title marketable. 
A water connection had been part of the leased property for 
the entire term of the lease, and the connection was located on the 
leased property. Although the water company did not currently have 
a procedure for splitting a water share, the company president 
acknowledged that the company would be required to develop such a 
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procedure. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion 
in ordering the parties to continue their present practice of 
splitting the single water share. 
Plaintiff suffered damages from the delay in receiving 
specific performance. The law allows damages for delay in 
receiving an equitable remedy. The award of damages was therefore 
proper. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN ORDERING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
A. Introduction and standard of review. 
The defendants' primary argument on appeal appears to be that 
the contract was indefinite and therefore not susceptible to 
specific performance. Defendants base this argument on dictum from 
Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). Pitcher 
cites 49 Am. Jur. Specific Performance § 22, now found at 71 Am. 
Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 30 (1973) . Section 31 of that work 
states: 
In the law of contracts, the mere fact 
that a sufficiently exact meaning of the terms 
of a contract can be ascertained only by 
considering admissible evidence of extrinsic 
facts does not render the agreement invalid 
for indefiniteness; it is sufficient if it can 
be made certain by proof. And although a 
greater degree of certainty may be required by 
the court before it will grant a decree of 
specific performance than would be required in 
an action at law for damages for breach of the 
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contract, a contract is considered to be 
sufficiently definite and certain to be 
specifically enforceable if it contains 
provisions which are capable in themselves of 
being reduced to certainty or of being made 
certain by the aid of legal presumptions or 
evidence of established customs, and from 
which the intention of the parties can be 
clearly ascertained. . . . 
Accord Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P. 2d 976, 978 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (affirmed specific performance of option 
contract where the trial court received parol evidence to resolve 
an ambiguity, and thereby rendered the agreement "clear and 
enforceable"). 
The hand-written contract at issue, drafted by David Baldwin, 
was enforceable. On issues where Mr. Baldwin had failed to include 
sufficient detail, the trial court was able to supply the necessary 
detail by resort to legal presumptions, established customs, other 
rules of law, and evidence of the conduct of the parties. This 
evidence fully supports the trial courts order. 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy, and "may not be 
upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion." Id. at 
979 (citing Morris v. Svkes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981)). Where 
the trial court makes factual findings based on extrinsic evidence, 
those findings and the resulting judgment will not be reversed 
unless clearly erroneous. Id., 768 P.2d at 978 (citing Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a)). 
Defendants do not specifically challenge any of the trial 
court's factual findings. A challenge to the findings of fact 
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would require that the defendants first specifically identify the 
finding which they challenge. Defendants would then have been 
required to marshal the evidence relating to that finding, to show 
the finding was not supported by competent evidence. State v. 
Bvrns, 911 P.2d 981, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Defendants have 
made no effort to challenge any factual findings in this manner. 
This Court must therefore presume that each of the trial court's 
findings was supported by the evidence. Id. The only remaining 
issues, therefore, are whether any legal decisions made by the 
trial court were correct, and whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering specific performance. 
B. The contract granted plaintiff an option. 
The meaning of a contract should first be determined from the 
four corners of the contract itself. Courts then look to extrinsic 
evidence, with preference to documents which were part of the same 
transaction. Finally, resort is had to the rule that documents are 
construed against the drafter. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division 
of State Lands and Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Krauss 
v. Utah State Department of Transportation. 852 P.2d 1014, 1019 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) ; Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 
Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (1957). Application of these 
principles fully supports the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. 
The agreement itself admits of only one interpretation. 
Paragraph 3 of the 1992 contract stated "the grantee may have the 
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first right of refusal to purchase said property," yet provided a 
mechanism for fixing the purchase price in the event plaintiff 
exercised that right. This Court should look at the nature of the 
right conferred, rather than the label. Property Assistance Corp. 
v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding 
"option" contract was really a non-optional contract of sale); 
G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis. 773 P.2d 841, 846 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(finding the word "option" actually meant right of first refusal); 
Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 621 (1913) (finding 
the word "option" to actually denote a right of first refusal). If 
a right of first refusal were intended, there would be no need to 
specify a mechanism to determine the price. The price would have 
already been determined by the offer which triggered the right of 
first refusal. By specifying a mechanism to determine the price, 
the parties evidenced an intent only consistent with an option. 
The extrinsic evidence supports this interpretation. The 1984 
contract, which the trial court held was part of the same trans-
action, expressly granted an option. Testimony of witnesses showed 
that Mr. Baldwin had referred to the right under the 1992 contract 
as an option. Finally, the provision was drafted by Mr. Baldwin 
and any remaining ambiguity should be construed against him. 
C. The price was sufficiently definite. 
The agreement provided that plaintiff could purchase the 
property at fair market value. "[A]n agreement which sets a price 
that is determined by factors outside the contract, such as a 
21 
market price or the price in another contract, is valid and 
enforceable." Plateau Mining Co, v. Utah Division of State Lands 
and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 726 (Utah 1990). Defendants challenged 
the agreement in this case because the agreement also stated that 
the fair market value was to be "established by the opinions of 
three (3) independent appraisers, to be selected by mutual 
agreement of the parties hereto." Defendants claim this created a 
requirement of further agreement between the parties and was 
therefore not specifically enforceable, citing Cottonwood Mall Co. 
v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988). This claim must be 
evaluated, however, in the light of defendants' own obligation of 
good faith and in light of the relative importance of this term to 
the overall transaction. 
All terms in a contract are not of equal importance: 
There is no principle of equity that demands 
all the terms of the contract must be set 
forth in the written agreement. Rather, 
although an agreement is uncertain or 
incomplete in some respects, its specific 
enforcement may nevertheless be decreed where 
the uncertainty relates to matters which the 
law makes certain or complete by presumption, 
rule or custom and usage. 
Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Utah 1980). Although price is 
a critical term, the mechanism for determining the price is not so 
important. This is illustrated in Marder's Nurseries, Inc. v. 
Hopping, 573 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div. 1991). The contract in that 
case provided that the purchase price was to be set by two 
appraisers, and provided that if those appraisers could not agree, 
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they should select a third appraiser, with the price to be fixed by 
the decision of any two such appraisers. 573 N.Y.S.2d at 992. The 
defendant argued this provision was too vague for enforcement. The 
appellate court agreed: 
The method designed by the parties, moreover, 
is seriously flawed, since there is no 
guarantee that the first two appraisers would 
agree, or that, in the event of their 
disagreement, they would be able to agree as 
to the identity of the third appraiser. 
Further, there is no guarantee that the third 
appraiser, if he or she agreed to the 
appointment, would concur with either one of 
the original two. 
573 N.Y.S.2d at 995. The court nonetheless held the agreement was 
specifically enforceable. The court noted that, while certainty 
was necessary for enforcement, "this doctrine has never been 
applied *with a heavy hand.7" 573 N.Y.S.2d at 993 (citations 
omitted). The court stated: "Absolute certainty has never been 
required. Instead, reasonable certainty has always been viewed as 
sufficient to avoid the xlast resort' of canceling an otherwise 
valid contract." Id.6 The court concluded: 
6This statement is consistent with the rule in Utah, which was 
stated in Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P. 2d 327, 330 
(1970), as follows: 
We recognize the validity of the rule 
relied upon by the defendants that to be 
enforceable a contract must be sufficiently 
definite in its terms that the parties know 
what is required of them. But like all rules, 
which are necessarily stated in generality, it 
is only applicable in the proper circum-
stances, where the justice of the case 
requires: as a shield to protect a party from 
an injustice, and not as a weapon with which 
to perpetrate an injustice. 
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In the present case, the parties agreed 
to a purchase price that would reflect the 
"fair market value" of the property. . . . 
That the procedure by which the "fair market 
value" is to be determined lends itself to 
stalemate is not a fatal defect since . . . a 
court may break any stalemate by determining 
fair market value itself. 
573 N.Y.S.2d at 995 (citations omitted). Accord Tonkery v. 
Martina. 562 N.Y.S.2d 895, aff'd 577 N.E.2d 1024 (N.Y. 1991). 
In addition, the contract must be read in light of the 
parties7 duty of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants had an 
obligation to act in good faith. In Tanner v. Baadscraard, 612 P.2d 
345 (Utah 1980) , a case where the parties had agreed to a sale and 
an increase in the interest rate, but had not agreed to what 
interest rate was to be used, the Court found that the parties had 
a duty of good faith to make an effort to cooperate pursuant to the 
agreement. The Court stated: 
When parties have entered into a formal contract, such as 
for the purchase of real property, it is to be assumed 
that they will cooperate with each other in good faith 
for its performance, and one refusing to so perform, or 
claiming a forfeiture thereof, has the burden of showing 
justification for doing so. 
612 P.2d at 347. 
David Baldwin did not assert that he could not agree on 
appraisers, nor did he state which three appraisers he would 
accept. He merely withdrew his offer for sale of the property. 
Plaintiff's tender stated her willingness to work with Mr. Baldwin 
in selecting appraisers. It is likely that plaintiff would have 
agreed to any three appraisers Mr. Baldwin chose. It was not the 
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lack of agreement concerning appraisers which defeated the 
contract, but Mr. Baldwin's denial that any contract existed. 
D. The description of the property is sufficiently definite 
for enforcement. 
The trial court found that "[w]hile no legal description was 
set forth in Exhibit 1, the premises were easily demarcated and the 
parties all understood the boundaries of the premises." Defendants 
do not claim this finding lacks evidentiary support; in fact, 
plaintiff is not aware of any contrary evidence. Defendants argue, 
however, that the lack of a legal description rendered the 
agreement unenforceable. This argument lacks merit. 
The description of the property is sufficient under Utah law 
for the sale of the property by contract. In Reed v. Alvey, 610 
P.2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980), the written agreement described the 
subject property as "corner of Hillview and Ninth East." The Court 
in Reed stated: 
In reviewing the written agreement evidencing the 
contract, and any ambiguity inherent in the language 
used, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the court 
to delineate the intent of the parties and the enforce-
ability of the contract. Thus, courts are provided a 
means by which they can look beyond the terms found in 
the written agreement to ascertain the intent of the 
contracting parties. If from this examination of the 
transaction the courts determine the actual contract is 
certain and the obligation and rights of the parties 
defined, then they may employ their equitable powers to 
enforce the contract via specific performance. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In the contract before this Court, the language reads, "the 
grantor hereby grants the use of to grantee certain restaurant (or 
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cafe) and motel (or gift shop) property located in Boulder Utah, 
Garfield County, State of Utah." Defendants assert that there is 
vagueness because there is a residential property owned by 
defendants adjacent to the cafe property. However, by the parties' 
own conduct, it is clear the parties did not intend the Agreement 
to cover the residential property. Plaintiff was never associated 
with the use of the residential property. In addition, at the time 
of the agreement, the residential property was not even in 
defendants' names, but was titled in the names of Howard and Ida 
Church. 
In Hackford v. Snow. 657 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Utah 1982), the 
Court stated: 
Appellants also claim that the agreement . . . did not 
describe the subject property with sufficient certainty 
as to justify specific performance. . . . In the instant 
case, the property was described as *Neola, (420 acre 
Hackford Farm), Uintah County, State of Utah." Although 
not precise, the description is sufficient to admit 
extrinsic evidence to aid in determining the parties' 
intentions, particularly in view of the trial court's 
finding of part performance. 
The Hackford description is virtually identical to the 
situation before the Court. There is no difference in the 
specificity of the two descriptions. There is enough information 
that, with extrinsic evidence, the agreement can be made definite. 
See also Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503 (Utah 1976) (holding 
that extrinsic evidence could come in to explain "PC" as Park City 
and that description was not indefinite); Park West Village, Inc. 
v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) (a description of "residence 
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106 Pacific Avenue, aka 106 Lumbar Yard.M was sufficient enough to 
enforce an option to purchase the property even though the 
description was not accurate). 
Clearly, the parties have had no difficulty determining which 
property was to be leased since 1984, the first lease agreement. 
In Eliason v. Watts. 615 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah 1980), the Court 
relied on the rule of law that ,nIn equity, that is certain which 
can be made certain'" and found the intent of the parties in the 
case was ascertained through the doctrine of part performance. The 
Court further went on to find that such evidence was sufficient to 
enforce the agreement. There is no issue as to which property was 
the subject of the option to purchase in this agreement. 
E. The lack of Gloria Baldwin's signature does not affect 
the validity of the agreement. 
The trial court found that David Baldwin acted as Gloria 
Baldwin's agent in signing the agreement, and that Gloria Baldwin 
ratified the agreement by her conduct. She was present when the 
agreement was drafted and signed, and never voiced any objection to 
it. The issue of whether the trial court properly held Gloria 
Baldwin estopped from now contesting the agreement is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 
61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Defendants do not claim any insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to support this finding, and it should be 
affirmed. 
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In addition, the lack of Gloria Baldwin's signature does not 
affect David Baldwin's duty to honor the contract. David Baldwin 
was not required to have title until the time came for performance. 
Corporation Nine v. Taylor. 30 Utah 2d 57, 513 P.2d 417, 412 
(1973) . Defendants did not allege nor prove that it would have 
been impossible for him to honor his contract. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED COMPLIANCE WITH 
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS. 
Defendants7 obligation to convey title must be construed to 
mean and refer to clear and marketable title, free of all liens and 
encumbrances. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 123 (1975) ; 
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah 1983). Marketable or 
merchantable title is that quality of title which a reasonably 
prudent man familiar with the facts would accept in the ordinary 
course of business. It must be free from liens and encumbrances, 
free from reasonable doubt as to its validity, and free from the 
hazard of present or potential litigation. Hedaecock v. Stewart 
Title Guaranty Co., 676 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); 
Darby v. Keeran. 211 Kan. 133, 505 P.2d 710, 715 (1973). An 
adverse claim to the property may render the title unmarketable, 
even if the adverse claim is not actively asserted. Paramount 
Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 1 Cal. 3d 562, 
463 P.2d 746, 749, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970); Michaelson v. Tieman. 
36 Colo. App. 435, 541 P.2d 91 (1975). 
28 
The presence of the underground storage tanks clearly made 
title unmarketable. Defendants did not dispute that. Utah Code 
Ann. S 19-6-402(24) (Supp. 1996) defines an owner of property 
containing an underground storage tank as a "responsible party" for 
purposes of the Underground Storage Tank Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-
6-401 to -427, which act imposes significant duties and potential 
liabilities on responsible parties. 
The obligation to remove the underground storage tanks and 
ensure compliance with environmental regulations was simply an 
extension of the implied requirement of marketable title. Although 
not specified in the contract, the contractual obligation is 
rendered certain by the aid of legal presumptions. 71 Am. Jur. 2d 
Specific Performance § 30 (1973). The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in ordering removal of the storage tanks. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED PLAINTIFF 
THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING WATER CONNECTION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-11 states: 
A right to the use of water appurtenant to 
land shall pass to the grantee of such land, 
and, in cases where such right has been 
exercised in irrigating different parcels of 
land at different times, such right shall pass 
to the grantee of any parcel of land on which 
such right was exercised next preceding the 
time of the execution of any conveyance 
thereof; subject, however, in all cases to 
payment by the grantee in any such conveyance 
of all amounts unpaid on any assessment then 
due upon any such right; provided that any 
such right to the use of water, or any part 
thereof, may be reserved by the grantor in any 
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such conveyance by making such reservation in 
express terms in such conveyance, or it may be 
separately conveyed. 
The trial court specifically found that the water right was 
appurtenant to the cafe property. The facts supported that 
finding, and defendants have not claimed otherwise. The president 
of the water company testified he believed the water was 
appurtenant. Plaintiff testified she had always paid for the water 
for the cafe and for defendants' home. The water was initially 
attached to the motel which is on the cafe property. This Court 
should affirm the finding that the water was appurtenant. 
Defendants now claim that the water share cannot be divided, 
and that compliance with the court's decree would leave defendants' 
without water. This claim has no substance. Although the water 
company does not currently have a mechanism to divide the water 
share, the water company president acknowledged that the company 
would have to devise such a mechanism. Plaintiff was only awarded 
one-half of the water share, so there is no risk of defendants 
being deprived of water. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR THE 
DELAY IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
Defendants claim the trial court erred by awarding plaintiff 
both a legal and equitable remedy. This is not so. The damages 
awarded were for the delay in receiving the equitable remedy. Such 
damage awards are well-supported under Utah law. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated, Mthe doctrine of election 
of remedies is a technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not 
to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress 
for a single wrong." Anaelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 678 
P. 2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983) (quoting Royal Resources Inc. v. 
Gibralter Financial Corp.. 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979)). 
Further, Utah courts have consistently held that where there is 
delay in providing specific performance, damages may be awardable. 
LHIW. Inc. v. DeLorean. 753 P.2d 961, 964 (Utah 1988) ("any 
disadvantage inhering to LHIW from the delay between July (the 
expected closing date) and December (the court-ordered closing 
date) could have been recovered by an award of damages."); Bevan v. 
J.H. Constr. Co., Inc.. 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983) (finding damages 
for delay in closing on home); Wagner v. Anderson. 122 Utah 403, 
250 P.2d 577, 580 (1952) ("Assuming that the respondent's refusal 
to perform on time was wrongful, there arose in favor of the appel-
lants a cause of action for specific performance and also any 
special damages occasioned by the delay which the appellants can 
prove." (emphasis in original)) (citing to 49 Am. Jur. 198, and the 
annotation at 95 A.L.R. 228 "to the effect that when decreeing 
specific performance, a court of equity may award damages also to 
the plaintiff if the decree of specific performance will not give 
complete relief."). 
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Defendants do not contest the amount of damages awarded, and 
the award was amply supported by the evidence. The damage award 
should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES 
INCURRED ON APPEAL. 
The parties' contract provided for an award of attorney fees 
in any action to enforce the contract. Plaintiff was awarded 
attorney fees below, and this Court should direct that she be 
awarded her attorney fees incurred on appeal. Management Services 
Corp. v. Development Associates. 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' appeal challenges only the trial court's legal 
rulings. Defendants have not claimed any of the factual rulings 
were in error, nor made any attempt to marshal the evidence against 
any factual findings. All factual premises underlying the trial 
court's decree must, therefore, be deemed supported by the 
evidence. 
The trial court's legal rulings flow from and are compelled by 
the factual findings. The contract was sufficiently definite to be 
specifically enforced, and it granted plaintiff an option to 
purchase. The court's rulings on the gasoline storage tanks and 
water rights were consistent with the contract and the requirement 
to convey marketable title. 
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The judgment and decree of the trial court should be affirmed 
in all respects, and this case should be remanded with instructions 
to award plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee on appeal. 
DATED this 3 ^ ^ day of December, 1996. 
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